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INTRODUCTION

The limited liability company business form has revolutionized the
business association world, offering corporate liability protection and
59
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partnership-like tax benefits to business owners.' "It is a perfect replacement for the joint venture, general partnership and in many cases
the limited partnership [sic]. I would think a lot of entrepreneurs
would use this," says George W. Coleman, a Dallas attorney who assisted in drafting Texas's LLC law.2 Unfortunately, securities regulators say that scam artists have discovered the business form as well.'
The Securities and Exchange Commission and state regulators have
focused on so-called "wireless cable" 4 LLCs in recent years.5 In one
recent case, California regulators found that a blind, sixty-six-year-old
veteran invested his entire $35,000 life savings in a wireless cable television scheme when a "fast-talking promoter" approached him repeat6
edly at the VA hospital where he received daily oxygen therapy.
Adding insult to injury, many burned investors not only lose all
their money, they owe taxes on it as well. If they transfer their
IRAs to a promoter who takes the money and runs, the "transfer"
will be construed by the IRS as a withdrawal, and investors will owe
income taxes on the money, plus a 10% penalty if they [are] under
age 59 1/2.7

One of the first actions by the SEC against an LLC was SEC v.
Vision Communications, Inc.8 The action targeted a Texas LLC selling
interests in a "wireless cable" enterprise in the Wilkes-Barre/Scranton, Pennsylvania area.9 The SEC alleged that the defendants "raised
approximately $1.25 million ... using high pressure sales techniques,
... offering and selling interests in [the LLC]," which the SEC argued
constituted an unregistered sale of securities.1 ° According to the SEC,
the salespeople in Plano, Texas, telephoned "investors all over the
United States using high-pressure and harassing telephone techniques," making "numerous false statements to investors."1 1 Many of
the investors were financially unsophisticated, including retirees and
1. John R. Emshwiller, New Kind of Company Attracts Many-Some Legal,
Some Not, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1993, at B1.
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. "Wireless cable ... refers to a method of transmitting video entertainment
programming through the use of microwave radio technology .... [It] allows wireless
networks to broadcast television programming similar to that offered by cable television companies." Elaine A. Welle, Limited Liability Company Interests as Securities:
An Analysis of Federal and State Actions Against Limited Liability Companies Under
the Securities Laws, 73 DENy. U. L. REv. 425, 431 n.23 (1996).
5. See id. at 431.
6. Ellen E. Schultz, IRA Money May Attract Shady Deals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7,
1994, at C1.
7. Id.
8. See Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14,026, 56 SEC
Docket (CCH) 880, 880 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1994).
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. Alleged Boiler Room Sales of Interests in Cable Venture Subject of SEC Suit, 26
SEC. REG. & L. REP. 662, 662 (1994).
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blue-collar workers who were induced to invest their retirement funds
in the LLC. 12 The District Court issued an injunction prohibiting the
defendants from further sale of the unregistered securities. 3 Similar
actions have been filed against other LLCs selling interests in "wireless cable" enterprises."4 Because LLCs have traditionally not been
treated as securities for securities laws purposes, the promoters of
these schemes were able to entice investors who were without the protection of the securities laws.
The limited liability company has become one of the more attractive business associations, both for legitimate enterprises seeking flexibility in structure, shields from personal liability for company debts
and obligations, and tax advantages, and for the not-so-legitimate enterprises seeking shelter from personal liability for taking advantage
of the unwary. In order to assist and protect the investing public and
to provide certainty and structure for business owners, Texas should
amend its current statutory scheme to mandate the treatment of certain LLC interests as securities, modeling this legislation after the
Wisconsin approach-a three-tiered method of defining an LLC as a
security. Part II of this Comment will describe the LLC entity and its
history, enumerate its advantages, and give a brief description of the
1997 IRS taxation changes. Part III will delve into the much-debated
question whether LLC member interests are securities and will describe the benefits of treating them as such. Part IV will describe the
Texas treatment of LLC member interests to date and the problems
that accompany that treatment. Part V will describe some other
states' treatment of LLC interests and how the Wisconsin approach is
preferable. Part VI will enumerate the proposed changes to Texas law
modeled after those states' regulations.

II.

CHARACTERISTICS AND GENERAL COMMENTS
ABOUT THE LLC FORM

A.

History of the LLC in the United States

It is important to understand the meteoric rise of the LLC in order
to grasp the potential dangers to investors as its popularity grows.
"[T]he LLC is a distinctly modern creation in the United States;"'"
thus, little case law surrounds the resolution of most of the issues related to it. In the 1970s, the Hamilton Brothers Oil Company of Den12. Id.
13. SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., No. 94-0615 (CRR), 1994 U.S. Dist. WL
326868 (D.D.C. May 11, 1994).
14. See, e.g., SEC v. Shreveport Wireless Cable Television P'ship, No. Civ.A. 941781(HHG), 1998 WL 892948 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 1998); SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless
L.L.C., 991 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997); Commission Obtains TRO Against Knoxville,
LLC, et al., SEC DIGEST 94-130, July 12, 1994, available at 1994 WL 328317 (S.E.C.).
15. ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW
STUDENTS § 10.29, 283 (2d ed. 1998).
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ver sought to form an entity in the United States similar to the
limitada business form with which the company was familiar from its
dealings in Central America. 6 The Company decided to focus on Wyoming, a state that was attempting to attract business.17 The Wyoming

Legislature subsequently passed the first limited liability company
statute in the United States in 1977.18 Florida, hoping to encourage
businesses to move to that state, passed the second LLC Act in 1982.19
In 1980, the IRS's Proposed Regulations denied partnership taxation
to any business association in which no member was personally liable
for the debts of the enterprise;2 0 therefore, the LLC did not immedi-

ately attract much attention. It appeared that the LLC was no better
than a corporation: it offered limited liability, but it would still be sub-

ject to double taxation.22 However, in 1988, the IRS issued Revenue
Ruling 88-76 stating that an LLC created according to the Wyoming
act would be treated as a partnership for tax purposes.2 3 As a result,
Colorado and Kansas enacted LLC statutes in 1990; Texas, Nevada,
Utah, and Virginia followed in 1991, and most of the remaining states
followed suit soon thereafter.2 4

16. Id.
17. See id.; Michael J. Garrison & Terry W. Knoepfle, Limited Liability Company
Interests as Securities:A Proposed Framework for Analysis, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 577, 580
(1996).
18. See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 15, § 10.29, at 283; see also WYo. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to 17-15-136 (Michie 1977).
19. Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 17, at 580; see also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 608.401-471 (2001).
20. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (1980).
21. See Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 17, at 580.
22. See id.; Michael S. Schadewald & Tracy A. Kaye, Source of Income Rules and
Treaty Relief from Double Taxation Within the NAFTA Trading Bloc, 61 LA. L. REV.
353, 373 (2001) (citing I.R.C. §§ 61(a), 301(c)(1) (CCH 1999)). "Subchapter C Corporations" are subject to what is known as double taxation. The corporation itself is
taxed at the entity level on income, and then the shareholders are taxed again when
dividends are distributed. Id.
23. Jeffrey A. Maine, Evaluating Subchapter S in a "Check-the-Box" World, 51
TAX LAW. 717, 726-27 (1998). The issue in the Revenue Ruling was "whether a Wyoming limited liability company, none of whose members or designated managers are
personally liable for any debts of the company, is classified for federal tax purposes as
[a corporation] or as a partnership." Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, obsoleted by
Rev. Rul. 98-37, 1998-2 C.B. 133. The IRS listed the corporate characteristics as "(1)
associates, (2) an objective to carry on a business and [derive profits from it], (3)
continuity of life," (4) centralized management, (5) limited liability for corporate
debt, "and (6) free transferability of interests." Id. The IRS ruled that "whether a
particular [business association] is to be classified as a corporation for tax purposes
must be determined by taking into account the presence or absence" of those characteristics. Id. at 360-61. "[I1f an unincorporated [association has] more corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics," then it is taxed as a corporation. Id. at
360-61. Though the limited liability company at issue had associates and an objective
to carry on a business for profit, the IRS ruled that it did not possess the remaining
corporate characteristics and would therefore be taxed as a partnership. Id. at 360-61.
24. Robert B. Keatinge, New Gang in Town: Limited Liability Companies:An Introduction, Bus. L. TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 5, 6.
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The LLC form was designed to escape corporate double taxation
and to allow profits and losses to pass through to members for tax
purposes. 25 In addition, it avoids the mandatory corporate formalities, such as required meetings, board of directors, voting rights, and
officers. 26 In financial structure, the LLC can also avoid the application of corporate statutes' legal capital requirements. 27 Though a general partnership can also achieve the above goals, LLC members have
shareholder-like limited liability, while general partners have unlimited personal liability for the debts and obligations of the partnership.28 "Partnership/corporation hybrids," though, are not new: the
limited partnership has been the business association of choice for
many business people who wish to avoid personal liability and the formalities of a corporation.2 9 The advantage of the LLC, though, is that
there is no limit on the amount of control that each member can exercise over the enterprise, whereas limited partners must not exercise
too much control over the partnership or risk losing their liability
shield.3 ° In addition, no one member needs to be subject to unlimited
liability, as that of a general partner in a limited partnership-all LLC
members can enjoy limited personal liability.3 ' Today, many commentators assert that the LLC will largely replace the partnership and
the closely held corporation, and that it will dominate the nonpublicly
traded business form.32 In fact, in Texas, 16,844 LLCs were formed,
compared to 40,395 corporations, in just one year.33 Therefore, steps
must be taken as early as possible to prevent problems such as those
witnessed in the "wireless cable" cases.
B.

The Texas Limited Liability Company Act

This Section will use the Texas Limited Liability Act's provisions to
describe the basic characteristics of the LLC form. The Texas Limited
Liability Company Act (hereinafter the TLLCA) was originally
passed in 1991 and last revised in 2001.1' It combines features from
25. MARK A. SARGENT & WALTER D. SCHWIDETZKY, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HANDBOOK: LAW-SAMPLE DOCUMENTS-FORMS § 1.03, 1-3 (1994-1995 ed.
1994) [hereinafter SARGENT HANDBOOK].
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1-3 to 1-4.
29. Id. at 1-4.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the
Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 446 (1996); see also Jonathan
R. Macey, The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for CorporateLaw, 73 WASH. U.
L.Q. 433, 436-37 (1995); Maine, supra note 23, at 718-20.
33. E-mail from Tina Passell, Manager, Public Information & Technology, Corporations Section, Texas Secretary of State, to Kimberley Latham, Author (Oct. 29,
2001, 12:15:47 EST) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review) (referring to fiscal
year 2000 statistics).
34. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2002).
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both the Texas Business Corporations Act (hereinafter the TBCA)
and the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act (hereinafter the
TRLPA).3 5 It uses some of the same broad language as that used in
the TBCA, stating that an LLC formed under the Act "may engage in
any lawful business," 3 6 unless the LLC sets forth a more limited purpose in its Articles of Organization. 37 Further, the TLLCA dictates
that "each [LLC] shall have the power provided for a corporation
under the TBCA and a limited partnership under the [TRLPA]." '3 8
The Act includes both mandatory rules that must be followed by all
LLCs and default rules that apply in the case that an LLC fails to
specify otherwise in its Articles of Organization.3 9
1. Formation
The formation of an LLC can be accomplished with relative ease.
To form an LLC, one or more organizers of the LLC must file Articles
of Organization with the Secretary of State. n0 A natural person eighteen years of age and older "may act as an organizer of an [LLC],
without regard to place of residence, domicile, or organization, [simply] by signing the Articles of Organization for" the LLC and filing
the Articles with the Secretary of State.4 1 The Articles of Organization for the LLC are very similar to the Articles of Incorporation used
for the corporation. 42 They must give the name of the LLC, n3 "the
period of duration, which may be perpetual, '4 4 "[t]he purpose for
which the LLC is organized which may be stated to be the transaction
of any or all lawful business,"4 5 "[t]he address of its registered office"
and organizers, 4 6 and "[a]ny other provisions . . .that the members
elect to set out . . .for the regulation of the internal affairs of the
[LLC]." 47 Other additional information is required if the LLC is being organized pursuant to a plan of merger or conversion or is a professional LLC.48 In addition, the Articles must indicate whether the
35. Compare id., with TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2002)
(TBCA), and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 2002)
(TRLPA).
36. Compare TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.01(A) (Vernon 1997),
with TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.01 § A (Vernon Supp. 2002).
37. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.01(A) (Vernon 1997).
38. Id. § 2.02(A) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
39. Id. passim.
40. Id. § 3.01(A) (Vernon 1997).
41. Id.
42. Compare id. § 3.02 (Vernon Supp. 2002), with TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art.
3.02 § A (Vernon Supp. 2002).
43. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 3.02(A)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
44. Id. § 3.02(A)(2).
45. Id. § 3.02(A)(3).
46. Id. § 3.02(A)(4), (6).
47. Id. § 3.02(A)(9).
48. Id. § 3.02(A)(6)-(8).
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LLC will have managers, and must include the names and addresses
of the managers or the "initial members." 49
2.

Regulations

The LLC may adopt "regulations," which are similar to corporate
bylaws.5" The regulations may detail the management and regulation
of the LLC, so long as they are consistent with law and the Articles of
Organization. The regulations may also articulate the method for admitting and expelling members,5 1 allocation of profits and losses,5 2
and the reasons and process for dissolving and winding up the LLC.5 3
This allows the LLC substantial flexibility in structuring the affairs of
the company according to members' wishes. According to Professor
Sargent,54 "[t]he flexibility allowed to LLCs deserves particular emphasis. '5 5 The LLC statutes in general, and Texas included,56 contain
no rules that govern the issuance of ownership interests, creation of
classes of interests, or the allocation of equity contributions to any
stated capital or capital surplus accounts, as is required with the corporate form. 57 "This hands-off approach," says Professor Sargent,
"leaves virtually all of the essential elements of the capital structure to
be determined by the parties, with results reflected in an 'operating
agreement' that is roughly analogous to a general partnership agreement. '58 In addition, the LLC statutes contain none of the corporate
statutes' requisite hierarchy of shareholders, directors, and officers, allowing the owners of the business to use the operating agreement and
regulations to set up the management of the entity as they please.5 9
Therefore, "[w]hole bodies of corporate law doctrine, such as the rule
invalidating board-sterilizing agreements, are rendered irrelevant." 6
3.

Management

Unless otherwise specified in the Articles of Organization or regulations, "the business and affairs of [an LLC will] be managed under the
49. Id. § 3.02(A)(5).
50. Compare id. § 2.09, with TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.23 (Vernon Supp.
2002). Both LLC regulations and corporate bylaws may include provisions dealing
with management-the quantity, term, and titles of managers-meeting times and
locations, dissolution procedures, and so forth.
51. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, §§ 4.05, 5.05 (Vernon 1997).
52. See id. § 5.02-1(A).
53. See id. §§ 6.01 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2002), 6.03 (Supp. 2002).
54. Professor Mark A. Sargent, Professor of Law at the University of Maryland
School of Law, is a leading commentator in the emerging LLC arena. He has published a number of law review articles and a book on the subject.
55. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 25, § 1.03, at 1-4.
56. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2002).
57. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 25, § 1.03, at 1-4.
58. Id. (footnote omitted).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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direction of the manager or managers of the [LLC]. 6 1 If the members desire, though, management of the LLC may be reserved to the
members in entirety, and no "managers" will be required.62 This has
led to the conceptual distinction made in academic circles between
"member-managed" LLCs and "manager-managed" LLCs.6 3 This
distinction may be important for securities law purposes, as discussed
below.64
4.

Membership

In Texas, an LLC "may have one or more members. ' 65 "The [LLC]
regulations may establish classes or groups of members . . . having
certain ... rights, powers, and duties, including voting rights," which
may be senior to those of other classes of members.6 6 Significantly, "a
member or manager is not liable for the debts, obligations, or liabilities of [the LLC] including under a judgment decree, or order of a
court," unless the regulations provide otherwise,6 7 so owners of LLCs
allegedly engaged in fraudulent promotion schemes or other unwise
business practices may walk away unscathed. Similar to the Texas Revised Partnership Act, members do not have an interest in specific
LLC property, 68 but the membership interest itself is personal property.6 9 Membership interests are assignable,7" but the assignment of a
membership interest does not effect a dissolution of the LLC, "or entitle the assignee to participate in the management [or] affairs of the
[LLC] or to become or exercise any rights of a member" unless the
regulations otherwise provide.7 1 The LLC's regulations may provide
that a Certificate of Membership Interest issued by the LLC evidences
a member's membership interest.7 2
5. Contribution and Distribution
A member's contribution to the LLC may consist of "any tangible
or intangible benefit to the [LLC]." ' 3 Profits and losses of the LLC
are allotted to the members according to the regulations, and if no
regulation was set forth, the TLLCA provides that the profits and
losses are to be allocated according to the percentage interest in the
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
bution

TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.12(A) (Vernon 1997).

Id.
See, e.g., Keatinge, supra note 24, at 5.
See infra Part III.
TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 4.01(A).
Id. § 4.02(A).
Id. § 4.03(A).
Compare id. § 4.04(A), with id. at art. 6132b, § 2.04 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
Id. at art. 1528n, § 4.04(A) (Vernon 1997).
Id. § 4.05(A)(1).
Id. § 4.05(A)(2).
Id. § 4.05(B).
Id. § 5.01(A) (Vernon Supp. 2002) (including a partial list of forms that contrimay take).
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LLC. 4 Similarly, allocations of cash and other assets of the LLC are
to be made in the manner set forth in the regulations, and "[i]f the
regulations do not [so] provide [then the] distributions shall be made
on the basis of the agreed value.., of the contributions made by each
member."7 5
6.

Dissolution

An LLC shall be dissolved upon the first of the following to occur:
1) expiration of the period of duration of the LLC, if any; 2) the occurrence of an event specified in the Articles of Organization or regulations to cause dissolution; 3) the unanimous action of members to
dissolve the LLC where capital contributions were made to the LLC;
4) the act of a majority of members or managers to dissolve the LLC
where no capital contributions were made; 5) unless otherwise provided for in the regulations, the death, expulsion, withdrawal, bankruptcy, or dissolution of a member (unless there is at least one
remaining member of the LLC and all remaining members vote to
continue the business of the LLC); or 6) the entry of a judicial dissolution decree.7 6 Upon dissolution, the LLC's affairs are to be wound up
as soon as practically possible by the managers, members, or any other
person specified to carry out the dissolution. 7 The assets of the LLC
are then to be transferred to, in order, 1) creditors, including any
member who is a creditor for an amount other than contributions to
the LLC; 2) unless the regulations state otherwise, to past and present
members to satisfy the LLC's distribution liability; and 3) unless provided otherwise, to members according to their respective rights and
interests.7 8
C.

The "Check-the-Box" Revolution

With the advent of the "check-the-box" regulations, unincorporated
business associations such as the LLC became more attractive. Prior
to the IRS's "check-the-box" regulations, the tax classification of an
unincorporated business form depended on four corporate characteristics (known as the Kintney regulations): "continuity of life, free
transferability of interests, centralized management, and limited liability."7 9 If the entity possessed a preponderance of the corporate characteristics, it was taxed as a corporation, but if it did not, it was subject
to the flow-through taxation similar to a partnership.8" This led to
numerous problems as business owners, tax practitioners, and the IRS
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. § 5.02-1(A) (Vernon 1997).
Id. § 5.03(A).
Id. § 6.01(A) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
Id. § 6.03(A) (Vernon 1997).
Id. § 6.04(A) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
See Maine, supra note 23, at 730 & n.79.
See id. at 730 & n.81.
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found themselves spending tremendous amounts of time and resources adhering to the formalistic factors. 8
In May 1996, the Treasury Department proposed regulations,8 2
coined "check-the-box" regulations, eliminating the four formalistic
factors and allowing business owners to make an election regarding
tax status.83 The regulations permitted most unincorporated entities,
such as limited partnerships and LLCs, to elect partnership taxation
by simply filing an election form.8 4 This allows the owners of the business to determine for themselves whether to be taxed as a partnership,
where the profits and losses of the enterprise flow through to the owners themselves for tax consequences to attach, or to be taxed as a corporation, where the income of the enterprise is taxed at the entity
level out of the business's assets and then taxed again if and when
profits are distributed to the owners. 85 The regulations became effective on January 1, 1997.86
The states responded by amending their LLC statutes to eliminate
statutory restrictions aimed at the Kintney test and to enhance LLC
drafting flexibility. 87 State statutes no longer needed to include provisions aimed at avoiding continuity of life; instead, the LLC could enjoy the seemingly unlimited life of the corporation.8 8 Texas amended
the TLLCA to eliminate the thirty-year duration limitation, and now
indicates that the period of duration "may be perpetual."8 9 States
could also eliminate restrictions intended to avoid management
schemes possessing corporate characteristics of centralized management.9" Under the check-the-box classification, whether management
is vested in a small group of managers or in all members equally is
irrelevant. 9' The TLLCA provides that the LLC's Articles of Organi81. Id. at 731 & n.83. Cautious attention to the regulatory scheme was mandatory
because LLCs necessarily possess the corporate limited liability characteristic, so
avoiding the remaining three factors to create the "majority" became arduous. Id. at
730.
The problem with the old, formalistic classification regime was that clients
and tax practitioners found themselves spending considerable resources in
ensuring desirable classification, even though partnership classification was
usually a foregone conclusion. On the other side, the Service found itself
spending considerable amounts of time interpreting each factor and issuing
private letter rulings to those seeking assurance as to classification.
Id. at 731.
82. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989 (May 13,
1996) (codified as amendments to Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3).
83. See Maine, supra note 23, at 731; Simplification of Entity Classification Rules,
61 Fed. Reg. at 21,989.
84. See Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,989.
85. See Maine, supra note 23, at 718; Schadewald & Kaye, supra note 22, at 373.
86. See Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,989.
87. See Maine, supra note 23, at 733.
88. Id. at 733-34.
89. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 3.02(A)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
90. Maine, supra note 23, at 733-34.
91. Id. at 734.
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zation can "reserve management of the [LLC] to the members in
whole or in part" or can provide for managers who are not even mem-

bers of the LLC.92 This particular aspect of the aftermath of the
check-the-box regulations supports the presumption that interests in
certain LLCs are securities, as discussed in Part III below. Finally, the
free transferability of interests is no longer cause for concern, and
states can and did eliminate provisions designed to avoid it and now

allow management voting rights to be transferred along with the LLC

ownership interests without jeopardizing pass-through taxation.9 3 The
TLLCA was amended to eliminate the restriction requiring the con-

sent of all members to any transfer of a member's interest. 94 It now
provides that "a membership interest is assignable in whole or in

part"95 and that the Articles of Organization may allow for the as-

signee to automatically become a member, with or without the con-

sent of other members. 96
As a consequence of all these changes, "LLC statutes are looking
increasingly similar to their corporate counterparts;" 97 they now "offer limited liability, perpetual existence, corporate dissolution provi-

sions, centralized management, and free transferability-[all of which]
can be tailored in the operating agreement, [making the LLC] more
attractive than the less flexible true corporate form. '"98
III.

Is

THE

LLC

MEMBER INTEREST A SECURITY,

AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?

The issue of whether members' interests in LLCs are securities has
been the topic of much debate, many law review articles, 99 and some

litigation. 100 Because the LLC is an unincorporated business form

that seems to be a hybrid between the corporation and the partner-

ship, there is little consensus to date.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.12 (Vernon 1997).
93. Maine, supra note 23, at 734.
94. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 4.07(A)(1).
95. See id. § 4.05(A)(1).
96. Id. § 4.07(A)(1).
97. Maine, supra note 23, at 735.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1069 (1992) [hereinafter Sargent, Securities?]; Marc I. Steinberg & Karen L. Conway, The Limited Liability Company as a Security, 19 PEPP. L.
REV. 1105 (1992); Welle, supra note 4; David L. Cohen, Comment, Theories of the
Corporationand the Limited Liability Company: How Should Courts and Legislatures
Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities Regulation for the Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427 (1998).
100. See, e.g., SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless L.L.C., 991 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997);
Nutek Info. Sys., Inc. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 977 P.2d 826 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998), cert.
denied sub nom., AKS Daks Communications, Inc. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 528 U.S.
932 (1999); Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14,026, 56 SEC
Docket (CCH) 880 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1994).

92. TEX.
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Why Does the Designation as a "Security" Matter?

The issue of whether an LLC interest is a security has been described as a "double-edged sword."' 1 That is, on one hand, if the
interests are designated as securities, "the investing public may benefit
from protection from securities fraud;" on the other, "investment and
entrepreneurship2 may be stymied if LLC interests are subject to se10
curities laws.'

If LLC interests do constitute "securities," then several consequences follow. First, offerings of such membership interests may
have to be registered under federal and state securities laws,10 3 unless
an exemption from registration can be found and utilized."° Under
federal law, the registration process would require that the LLC file a
Registration Statement with the SEC and deliver prospectuses to potential investors." 5 The failure to do so can lead to a private right of
rescission or civil and criminal liability. 1 6 Under Texas law, the registration process would require that the LLC file a Registration Statement with the State Securities Board as well. 10 7 Failure to do so at the
state level can lead to additional civil and criminal liability.'0 8
The second consequence of the designation of LLC interests as securities is the antifraud provisions of the federal and state securities
laws, regardless of whether the security is exempt from registration. 0 9
If LLC membership interests are not designated as securities, an investor's only remedy for material misstatements or omissions in connection with the purchase or sale of those membership interests will
fall under either common law fraud l a0 or the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act.'' While the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act ap101. Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 17, at 579.
102. Id.
103. Robert R. Joseph, Comment, Should Interests in Limited Liability Companies
Be Deemed Securities?: The Resurgence of Economic Reality in Investment Contract
Analysis, 44 EMORY L.J. 1591, 1592 (1995).
104. Exemptions from registration can be on the transaction level, which exempts
only the specific transaction in question. Examples of transaction exemptions include
private placements where securities are offered and sold only to a limited number of
informed investors, intrastate offerings where securities are offered and sold only to
residents of the state in which the issuer has its principal place of business, and insolvency or bankruptcy sales. Exemptions from registration can also be on the security
level, which exempts the security itself from registration forever. Examples of exempt
securities include government bonds, securities issued by nonprofit issuers, and insurance policies. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d (2000); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5815, 581-6 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f, 77j.
106. Id. §§ 771, 77t.
107. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-7(B), (C).

108. Id. at arts. 581-29, 581-33.
109. Joseph, supra note 103, at 1592-93.
110. See Keith A. Rowley, The Sky Is Still Blue in Texas: State Law Alternatives to
Federal Securities Remedies, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 99, 124-31 (1998).
111. See Mark C. Watler, The Applicability of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act to Securities Cases, 64 TEX. B.J. 542, 543-44 (2001).
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pears to be a beneficial remedy for the defrauded investor in an LLC,
it has not been tested in the security arena, and it is unclear
how the
1 12
courts would handle such investments under that law.
However, if LLC membership interests are designated as securities,
the defrauded investor will have the additional protection of the Texas
Securities Act and the Texas Business and Commerce Code.' 13 The
benefit to the defrauded investor here is that under the Texas Securities Act, it is not necessary, as it is with a common law fraud case, that
the plaintiff prove scienter-that the offending party either knew that
the representation he made was false or that he made the statement
with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity." 4 In addition, the plaintiff does not have to prove reliance on the seller's misstatement or
omission as he would in a common law fraud case; in other words, the
Securities Act does not mandate that the buyer prove that he would
not have purchased the interest if he knew of the misstated or omitted
facts." 5 Under the Texas Business and Commerce Code, the plaintiff
is similarly not required to prove scienter in conjunction with statutory stock fraud in order to recover. 116 In order to protect the investing public best, therefore, it is desirable to designate LLC membership
interests as securities and open the avenues of protection that the
Texas Securities Act and Texas Business and Commerce Code
provide.
The third consequence of designating the LLC interest as a security
involves continuous disclosure." 7 Continuous disclosure requirements mandate that reporting companies register with the SEC and
make regular filings of reports to the SEC and the public." 8 "The
most significant of the compelled reports is the annual report on Form
10-K, which is required to include an extensive description of the company's business, audited financial statements for the fiscal year, and
management's discussion and analysis of the position and performance of the company.""' 9 In addition, quarterly filings using Form 10Q are required.12° Both the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and the Texas Securities Act list among their purposes the protection
112. See id. at 543-44, 551.
113. See Rowley, supra note 110, at 148-81. See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
arts. 581-1 to -39 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 2002) (The Texas Securities Act); TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN.§ 27.01 (Vernon 2002).
114. Rowley, supra note 110, at 151-52.
115. Id. at 151-52.
116. Id. at 169-70.
117. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77aa (2000); TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
581-10-1 (Supp. 2002).
118. JAMES D. Cox, ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 9
(3d ed. 2001).
119. Id.
120. Id.
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of investors through this process.12 1 "The Acts were designed to protect the American public from speculative or fraudulent schemes of
promoters."' 122 Therefore, Congress broadly defined the term "security," and the U.S. Supreme Court has liberally applied that definition. 123 The Court has stated that "the reach of the Act does not stop
with the obvious and commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular
devices . . .are also reached if it be proved . . .that they were ...
'investment contracts,' or ... 'any interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security,"' ".124 in order to reach "the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others
on the promise of profits.' 25 The theory behind the Acts is that having access to all relevant information about a company best protects
investors.12 6 The "efficient market hypothesis" is that "a variety of
forces impound available information into stock prices fast enough
1' 27
that arbitrage opportunities cannot be exploited systematically.'
The SEC, securities lawyers, and the judiciary have expounded this
theory for many years to say that the essence of an accurately valued
stock market is the availability of accurate and complete information
about the companies involved.1 2 According to the efficient market
hypothesis, with a fast-growing number of LLCs being opened and
operated, if the securities laws do not require the release of informa1 29
tion about them, the market as a whole will become less efficient.
In Texas in the year 2000, nearly half as many LLCs were formed as
corporations, 3 ° leading to the obvious conclusion that these businesses are coming to occupy a large segment of the Texas business
world.
As stated earlier, the LLC has been an attractive new entity for
business owners. 3 ' One of the strongest features of the LLC is the
comparatively low interference from state regulations, and some will
argue that treating even some LLC interests as securities will erode
that feature. 132 In addition, some will argue that treating LLC interests as securities will ravage the limited liability of LLCs. 133 However,
as the number of LLCs increases, so does the potential for harm to the
121. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a), (g)(2); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-10-1(B)
(Vernon Supp. 2002).
122. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 481 (9th Cir. 1973).
123. Id.
124. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
125. Glenn W. Turner, 474 F.2d at 481.
126. See Cox, ET AL., supra note 118, at 1.
127. Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 851 (1992).
128. See id. at 851, 881, 889.
129. See id. at 851, 881-89.
130. See E-mail from Tina Passell, supra note 33.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2, 17-19.
132. See Cohen, supra note 99, at 464.
133. See id. at 467 & n.225.
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investing public by unscrupulous promoters. Some commentators
have said that while the LLC was created to circumvent the bureau-

cratic costs of corporations, the protection provided to LLC investors
13
outweighs costs associated with compliance with the securities laws. 1
Consequently, it is imperative that the states use the securities laws to
fulfill their designed purpose and protect those investors.
B.

Does an Interest in an LLC Meet the Definition of a "Security"?
The Federal Security Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act

of 1934 do'135
not mention LLC member interests in the definition of a
"security.
The term "security" includes "commonly known documents traded for speculation or investment," as well as "'securities' of
a more variable character," such as a "'certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,' 'investment contract,' and 'in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security.' "1136 The statutes' definitions of a "security," the clause limiting
coverage of the Acts if the "context otherwise requires," and the ambiguous items listed (such as "notes," "stock," and "investment contracts") have resulted in case law described as "both vast and
disorderly."' 3 7

The definition of what constitutes an "investment contract" was the
subject
of the landmark Supreme Court case, SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co. 138 Because LLC member interests are not included in the federal

Acts' or many states' statutory definitions of a "security" and most
134. See id. at 465; Welle, supra note 4, at 494.
135. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (2000). The definition of a "security" in
the Security Act of 1933, which is substantially the same as that in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, reads:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future,
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group
or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.
Id. § 77b(a)(1).
136. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10)).
137. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a), 77b(a)(1), 78c(a), 78c(a)(10); Cox, ET AL., supra note
118, at 117. For a statistical analysis of the case law surrounding the definition of a
security and use of the Howey test, see Theresa A. Gabaldon, A Sense of a Security:
An Empirical Study, J. CORP. L. 307 (Winter 2000).
138. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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LLCs do not title member interests as "stock" or "notes," most comwhether the memmentators focus on the Howey test to determine
139
bers' interests are "investment contracts.
In that case, the SEC brought an action to restrain W.J. Howey
Company "from using the mails and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce in the offer and sale of unregistered ... securities in violation of § 5(a) of the [Security] Act [of 1933]."41 The company owned
acres of citrus groves in Florida and offered 250 acres to the public
each year to finance additional development. 4 ' Howey-in-the-Hills
Service was a service company under the same control and management as W.J. Howey Company, and it was involved in developing and
cultivating many of the groves. 142 Each potential customer was told
that investment in a grove was not feasible without a service arrangement and then each was offered a land sales contract and a service
contract. 1 43 The purchaser was free to make service arrangements
with another company, though the "superiority of Howey-in-the-Hills
Service, Inc., [was] stressed."'1 4 4 The tracts of land were not separately
fenced, and the only indications that they were separately owned were
land marks in a plat book.1 45 The purchasers, for the most part, were
not residents of Florida. 146 They lacked the knowledge, skill, and
equipment necessary for fruit tree cultivation and were "attracted by
the expectation of substantial profits.' 47 Many of the1 48purchasers
were patrons of a nearby Howey Company hotel resort.
The issue facing the Court was whether "the land sales contract, the
warranty deed [delivered to the purchasers], and the service contract
together constitute an 'investment contract' within the meaning of
§ 2(1) [of the Security Act of 1933]." 1'4 The Court pointed out that
the term is not defined in the Act or by the legislative reports, but that
the term "investment contract" was pervasive in many state "blue
sky" laws prior to passage of the Act. 5 The term had been broadly
construed by state courts to provide the investing public with "a full
measure of protection." '5 1 "Form was disregarded for substance and
139. See, e.g., Sargent, Securities?, supra note 99, at 1082-84; Steinberg & Conway,
supra note 99, at 1107-11; Welle, supra note 4, at 441-65.
140. Howey, 328 U.S. at 294.
141. See id. at 295.
142. Id. at 294-95.
143. Id. at 295.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 296.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 297.
150. Id. at 298. "Blue Sky Laws" is the term generally used to refer to state securities laws. The term originated from the original objective of curbing promoters who
would sell interests having no more substance than "'so many feet of "blue sky ....
Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
151. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298.
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emphasis was placed upon economic reality."1'5 2 The Court found that
when Congress included "investment contract" in the definition of a
"security" in the Act, it was using the term as it had been defined by
previous judicial interpretation. 153 The Court then laid down the test
154
for determining the existence of an "investment contract.
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby [1] a person invests his
money [2] in a common enterprise and [3] is led to expect profits [4]
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being
immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by
formal certificates or by nominal
interests in the physical assets em155
ployed in the enterprise.
This definition had "been enunciated and applied many times by
lower federal courts, [and fulfills] the statutory purpose of compelling
full and fair disclosure [relating] to the issuance of 'the many types of
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.' "156 In addition, the definition "embodies a flexible
rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet
the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use
of the money of others on the promise of profits. ' 157 This can arguably be the case with LLCs, as they are a relatively new scheme used by
some as the vehicle through which investors are attracted by the
promise of future profits, such as in SEC v. Vision Communications,5 8
in which the SEC claimed that the promoters involved used the LLC
form to funnel over one million dollars from unsophisticated
investors.1 59
The Howey Court went on to find that the purchase and service
agreements were "investment contracts."' 6 ° The Court held that the
purchasers were involved in a common enterprise managed by the
Howey Company, and that they were led to expect profits from the
efforts of the Howey Company and Howey-in-the-Hills, not having
the skill, knowledge, or desire to put in the efforts themselves. 16 1
The Howey test "has posed severe analytical and policy
problems,"' 6 2 both in the application to LLCs and to many other
schemes dreamed up by clever promoters. 6 3
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 298-99.
155. Id. at 298-99.
156. Id. at 299 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 72-85, at 11 (1933)).
157. Id.
158. Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14,026, 56 SEC Docket
(CCH) 880 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1994).
159. See id.
160. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
161. Id. at 299-300.
162. Sargent, Securities?, supra note 99, at 1082.
163. See id. at 1082-83.
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For example, must there be an investment of cash in order to meet
the investment of "money" criterion? Is a "common enterprise"
present when a relationship exists only between the promoter and a
single investor (vertical commonality), or must there be more than
one investor whose investments are somehow pooled (horizontal
commonality)? What exactly is meant by "profits"? All of these
questions have occupied the courts and commentators for decades.
The most vexed question, however, and the one most determinative
of whether LLC interests are securities, is generated by Howey's
apparent requirement that the investor's ex 6ectation
of profits be
4
dependent "solely" on the efforts of others.
Nevertheless, it is the test used by the Court today to determine the
existence of an "investment contract," though it has been slightly
modified as discussed below. Each element of the Howey test will be
applied to LLCs in the following subparts to show that, in general, an
interest in an LLC satisfies each one.
1.

Investment of Money

The Supreme Court addressed the question of what constitutes an
"investment of money" in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniel.165 In that case, employees participated in a compulsory pension plan but made no payment into the fund; they merely accepted
employment with that condition attached. 166 The respondent argued
that by contributing his labor to his employer and by allowing his employer to pay money into the fund, that
he made an investment under
167
the definition of the Securities Acts.
The Court found that in determining whether one invests, "it is necessary to look at the entire transaction" and whether the person
"chose to give up a specific consideration in return for a separable
financial interest with the characteristics of a security. ' 168 The Court
held that, even in cases where the acquired interest has aspects of a
security and a non-security, in all cases the purchaser must give up
"some tangible and definable consideration in return for an interest
that had substantially the characteristics of a security. '169 The Court
went on to say that "[t]his is not to say that a person's 'investment,' in
order to meet the definition of an investment contract, must take the
form of cash only, rather than of goods and services. "170
Normally, a member's investment in an LLC will meet the requirements of the first prong of the Howey test because interest holders
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 1082-83 (footnotes omitted).
439 U.S. 551, 559-61 (1979).
See id. at 559.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 560 n.12 (citation omitted).
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usually contribute monetary amounts.1 7 ' The TLLCA merely requires that the contribution of a member consist of "any tangible or
intangible benefit to the limited liability company or other property of
any kind or nature, 17 2 which will likely meet the definition, because
anything that constitutes contractual consideration would probably be
7 3
sufficient to fulfill the "investment of money" requirement.1
Though the TLLCA does not require a minimum contribution, 7 4
members will usually agree on the property or services that each
member will contribute to the LLC. 175 Because "[c]ourts have
broadly interpreted the investment of money requirement, 1 1 76 it is unlikely any LLC membership interest would therefore fail to satisfy this
requirement.
2.

Common Enterprise

The federal circuits are split as to the definition and application of
this element, and the Supreme Court has thus far declined to clarify
the disagreement.17 7 According to Justice White, the crux of the disparity in treatment revolves around "horizontal" and "vertical" commonality. 7 ' Horizontal commonality requires a pooling of
investments, and it is required to meet the "Common Enterprise"
179
prong of the Howey test in the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.
Vertical commonality requires only the existence of a relationship between an investor and a broker, and it is required to meet the "Com180
mon Enterprise" prong in the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.
The Fifth Circuit has stated that the "critical inquiry" is whether the
171. Welle, supra note 4, at 442-43; Steinberg & Conway, supra note 99, at
1107-08.
172. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 5.01 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
173. Welle, supra note 4, at 442; see also Sargent, Securities?, supra note 99, at 1096;
Steinberg & Conway, supra note 99, at 1107-08.
174. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 5.01.
175. Welle, supra note 4, at 442-43.
176. Id. at 442 (citing Harris v. Republic Airlines, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T1
93,772 (D.D.C. May 19, 1988); Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976);
Sandusky Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan Groups, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Ohio 1975);
El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 1974)).
177. See Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1115-16 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that certiorari should be granted).
178. See id. at 1115-16 (White, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 1115-16 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980), affd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982);
Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100-01 (7th Cir. 1977); Wasnowic v.
Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066, 1068 (M.D. Pa. 1972), affid, 491 F.2d 752 (3d
Cir. 1973)).
180. Mordaunt, 469 U.S. at 1116 (White, J., dissenting) (citing SEC v. Cont'l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); Commercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache
& Co., 478 F.2d 39 (10th Cir. 1973); Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d
132 (8th Cir. 1970)).
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is necessainvestment's success or failure of the collective investments
181
rily dependent on the expertise of the promoter.
In either case, LLC member interests will normally satisfy the requirement.1 82 In general, interests in an LLC will satisfy the horizontal commonality requirement because the members are all interested
in the financial success of the LLC. 183 It should be noted that the
TLLCA allows LLCs to have only one member, 8 4 in which case the
horizontal commonality requirement would not be met, but this is
likely to arise only on an occasional basis."8 5 Similarly, the LLC will
likely meet the vertical commonality requirement, because in the typical scheme, the promoters and investors have a mutual goal. 186 In
several SEC actions, for example, the prosecutors alleged both horizontal and vertical commonality were present because each investor
shared87pro rata in the profits generated through operation of the
1
LLC
3.

Expectation of Profits

The leading case defining this element is United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.1 8' In this case, the tenants in a low-income cooperative housing project brought suit alleging violations of the federal
securities laws arising from the sale of shares in "common stock" of
the housing corporation. 8 9 In order to purchase an apartment, the
United Housing Foundation required that tenants purchase stock in
Riverbay, a not-for-profit housing corporation.1 90 Riverbay was organized by the United Housing Foundation as an owner and operator
of the buildings and land. 91 The shares did not possess the usual
characteristics of "stock," such as voting rights based on the number
owned or free transferability.1 9 2 Upon termination of occupancy, the
tenant was obligated to offer the shares back to Riverbay, and in the
unlikely event that Riverbay did not repurchase the shares, the tenant
could offer them to a prospective tenant who satisfied the statutory
181. Cont'l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 522.
182. See Steinberg & Conway, supra note 99, at 1108-09.
183. Id. at 1108-09.
184. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 4.01(A) (Vernon 1997).
185. Steinberg & Conway, supra note 99, at 1109.
186. Id.
187. Welle, supra note 4, at 444; see also, e.g., SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless L.L.C.,
991 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D.D.C. 1997).
188. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
189. Id. at 837, 841, 844-45.
190. Id. at 841-42.
191. Id. at 841.
192. See id. at 851. The characteristics "traditionally associated with stock" are a
right to receive "'dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits,"' negotiability, an ability to be pledged, "voting rights in proportion to the number of shares
owned," and capability of appreciating in value. Id. (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967)).
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income requirements. 193 However, the shares could not be sold for
more than the original price plus a fraction of the mortgage amortization that the tenant paid during his occupancy. 1 94 As mentioned earlier, the federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 include "stock" in the
definition of a security, 9 5 thus the tenants claimed that because the
shares purchased were called "stock," the antifraud provisions of the
securities acts applied. 9 6
The U.S. Supreme Court pointed out that "[t]he primary purpose of
the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely
unregulated securities market,"' 9 7 and that "[t]he focus of the Acts is
on ...the sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes,
the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the need for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the interest of investors."' 98 In
oft-quoted language, the Court stated that "Congress intended the application of these statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying
a transaction, and not on the name appended thereto."1 9 9 The Court
held that calling the shares "stock" was not dispositive and then analyzed the transactions under the Howey investment contract test. 2 °
The Court found that the tenants purchased the shares to acquire a
low-cost living space, not to invest for profit.2 ° ' The Court uses the
term "profit" to mean "either capital appreciation resulting from the
development of the initial investment" or "a participation in earnings
resulting from the use of [the] investors' funds. ' 20 2 An investor in securities is attracted by the prospect of a profitable return, not by a
desire to use or consume the item purchased.20 3 In addition, the
Court found that because the shares could not be sold for more than
their purchase and investment price, there was no possible profit from
a resale of the stock, and that the tax deductibility of the monthly
rental charge and the comparatively low rent do not sufficiently constitute "profit" within the meaning of the Howey test.20 4 In short, the
Court held that "[w]hat distinguishes a security transaction-and what
is absent [in this case]-is an investment where one parts with his
money in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of others, and
193. Id. at 842-43.
194. Id.
195. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (2000).
196. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 844-45.
197. Id. at 849.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. Id. at 851-60.
201. Id. at 853.
202. Id. at 852 (citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943);
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967)).
203. Id. at 852-53 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946); SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943)).
204. See id. at 854-55.
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not where he purchases a commodity
for personal consumption or liv20 5
ing quarters for personal use.
Applying the above holding to LLCs, many commentators agree
that this element is likely met.20 6 In most situations, investors will
contribute hoping for a return on their investment,2 0 7 and LLC members will ordinarily not be expecting an unconventional benefit.2 0 8 In
SEC actions taken against various LLCs, "prosecutors presented evidence that promoters enticed investors [with] brochures and sales
calls" promising "enormous and immediate returns" on investment,
demonstrating that subsequent purchasers were enticed to invest because of the expectation of profits. 20 9 Even though some state statutes
appear to allow for nonprofit LLCs, including the TLLCA, 210 "the
vast majority of LLCs [is] operated for profit, [because] an LLC that
does not conduct a business and have a profit objective risks losing the
[LLC] tax advantages. '2 11 In addition, Professor Sargent points out
that LLC members may be hoping simply "to take advantage of the
pass-through of losses for tax purposes. ' 212 The potential for tax
losses has been held to satisfy the "expectation of profits" requirement in other situations.2 1 3 Therefore, the LLC member interest
likely meets this element of the Howey test in most circumstances.
4.

Solely from the Efforts of Others

Most lower federal courts, when applying the Howey test, have
adopted a liberal definition of the "solely from the profits of others"
2 15 the Ninth Cirelement.214 In SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
205. Id. at 858.
206. See, e.g., Sargent, Securities?, supra note 99, at 1096; Steinberg & Conway,
supra note 99, at 1109-10; Welle, supra note 4, at 444-45.
207. Steinberg & Conway, supra note 99, at 1110.
208. Sargent, Securities?, supra note 99, at 1096.
209. Welle, supra note 4, at 445.
210. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.01 (Vernon 1997) (stating that an
LLC formed under the TLLCA "may engage in any lawful business"); id. § 2.02
(Vernon Supp. 2002) (stating that each LLC "shall have the power provided for a
corporation under the TBCA and a limited partnership under the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act").
211. Welle, supra note 4, at 445 & n.157.
212. Sargent, Securities?, supra note 99, at 1096 n.177.
213. Id.; see SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 583 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1982)
(licensing to sell product); Kolibash v. Sagittarius Recording Co., 626 F. Supp. 1173,
1178 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (a recording lease program).
214. Welle, supra note 4, at 445-46 (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc.,
474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973); Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers,
Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240 n.4 (4th Cir. 1988); SEC v. Prof'l Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th
Cir. 1984); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1984); SEC v. AquaSonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1982); Kim v. Cochenour, 687 F.2d 210,
213 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 778-79 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir. 1981); Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1040 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. Dain
Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976)).
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cuit enumerated a more flexible test than the strict wording of
Howey.2 16 In this case, the defendant corporation was offering "Adventures" and "Plans" to purchasers.2 1 7 The purchaser, in return for
his investment of $300-$5,000, received training and materials related
to self-motivation and sales ability. 21 8 With the purchase of certain
plans, the purchaser received the opportunity to help sell the courses
to others and earn a commission if he is successful. 2 19 The court acknowledged that what was being sold was not the typical business motivation course, but the opportunity to derive profits from the sale of
plans to new customers brought to the company.2 2 ° The court held
that the sale of these plans constituted a sale of investment contracts
within the meaning of the Securities Acts.22 '
The court had difficulty, though, with the portion of the Howey test
which required that the profits come solely from the efforts of
others.22 2 Because the purchasers in this case must exert some personal effort to bring additional purchasers to the company, it was argued that the expectation of profits was not coming solely from the
efforts of others. 223 The court held, though, due to the Securities
Acts' remedial character, the Acts' policy of protecting the public, and
the Supreme Court's repeated reminders that the definition of "security" should be flexible, that the Acts should be applied to "those
schemes which involve in substance, if not in form, securities. ' 224 The
court stated that the test is "whether the efforts made by those other
than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise. '22' Therefore, the court held that though the purchasers in this
case were required to contribute something more than mere money,
the crucial efforts affecting the enterprise's failure or success were
those of the company, not of the investor.22 6

While no language of the Supreme Court has directly indicated that
"solely" has been removed from the Howey test, its omission on two
separate occasions is a significant indicator that the "solely" standard
is being relaxed. The Supreme Court observed in Forman and Daniel
that "[t]he touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common
venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
See id. at 482.
Id. at 477-78.
See id. at 478.
Id. at 478-79.
Id. at 478-79.
See id. at 480, 483.
See id. at 481-83.
Id. at 482.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 483.
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from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." '2 7 In light
of the Court's constant instructions to view "transactions in light of
economic realities," and that promoters could easily circumvent the
securities laws if the term "solely" were interpreted literally, the Court
will likely adopt the more flexible and liberal interpretation when
presented with the question.2 28
As an alternative to the Glenn Turner analysis, the Fifth Circuit
enumerated a different test in Williamson v. Tucker,2 29 and held that
the substance of the transaction must be the guiding factor. 230 The
court stated that "the mere fact that an investment takes the form of a
general partnership or joint venture does not inevitably insulate it
from the reach of the federal securities laws., 23 1 That court set forth
three factors to determine whether a general partnership interest was
a security:
A general partnership or joint venture interest can be designated a
security if the investor can establish, for example, that (1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands of the
partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes power
as would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is so
inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers;
or (3) the partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurialor managerialability of the promoter or manager that
he cannot replace the manager of the enterprise232or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers.
This test has been uniformly applied by many courts to partnership
interests,23 3 and more importantly, it has also been applied by some
courts to LLC interests. 3
As applied to LLCs, academic commentators are split in this analysis. The crucial distinction is how the LLC itself is organized.23 5 If the
LLC is very closely held and member-managed, the LLC interest is
probably not a security as the profits will be expected from the efforts
of all of the members.2 36 However, many LLCs are not closely held
227. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975); see also Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561 (1979).
228. Welle, supra note 4, at 446.
229. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
230. See id. at 422-23.
231. Id. at 422.
232. Id. at 424 (emphasis added).
233. See, e.g., Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell, & Assocs., M.D.s, P.A., 104 F.3d 1256,
1263 (11th Cir. 1997); Koch v. Hankins, 928 F.2d 1471, 1478-80 (9th Cir. 1991).
234. See SEC v. Shreveport Wireless Cable Television P'ship, No. Civ.A. 941781(HHG), 1998 WL 892948, at *5-7 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 1998); SEC v. Parkersburg
Wireless L.L.C., 991 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D.D.C. 1997); Tschetter v. Berven, 621 N.W.2d
372, 376-78 (S.D. 2001).
235. See Welle, supra note 4, at 446.
236. See id. at 447.
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and may have hundreds of members, resembling corporations or limited partnerships where the members are passive participants. 3 7 The
SEC has focused on three factors: "(1) the lack of sophistication of
certain investors; (2) the special management or entrepreneurial skill
supplied by promoters or third parties; and (3) the lack of control the
investors have over the investment as a practical matter. '2 38 However, the drawback to this approach is that it requires an independent
investigation into each LLC's structure to determine if its membership
interests constitute securities.2 3 9 With limited partnerships, the presumption is that they are securities, 4 ° and this should arguably be the
case with manager-managed LLCs and LLCs with a large number of
members.
C.

Nutek Information Systems, Inc. v. Arizona Corp. Commission:
Applying the Howey Test to Limited Liability Companies

An important recent case dealing with a Texas LLC, and one of the
first to analyze the LLC-as-security issue, came from the Arizona state
courts. The Arizona Corporation Commission charged that the defendants were selling unregistered securities by marketing membership interests in LLCs. 2 41 The president and member-owner of SMR
Advisory Group, L.L.C., a Texas limited liability company, marketed
interests in several LLCs formed in Texas.2 42 The LLCs were to secure licenses and build and operate communications systems.2 4 3 The
defendants used telephone and written solicitations to recruit investors who would purchase "units" in a particular LLC.2 4 4 The defendants amassed over $10.4 million from approximately 920 investors,
combining those funds into a single account.24 5 The Securities Division of the Arizona Corporation Commission initiated proceedings
against the company and its president for violations of the Arizona
Securities Act's registration and anti-fraud provisions.2 46 The Coin
mission found that the membership interests in the LLCs constituted
securities.2 4 7
237. Id.
238. Id. at 449; see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981);
ParkersburgWireless L.L.C., 991 F. Supp. at 8.
239. See Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424.
240. See Steinberg & Conway, supra note 99, at 1110; Welle, supra note 4, at
449-50.
241. Nutek Info. Sys., Inc. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 977 P.2d 826, 827-28 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1998), cert. denied sub nom., AKS Daks Communications, Inc. v. Ariz. Corps.
Comm'n, 528 U.S. 932 (1999).
242. Id. at 828.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 829.
247. Id.
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The Arizona Court of Appeals pointed out that the issue of whether
such LLC membership interests constituted securities was a question
of first impression in the state. 248 The court held that an LLC should
not benefit from the presumption that LLC membership interests are
not securities, as general partnership interests do, because the nature
of limited liability for all members encourages unsophisticated investors to become involved, and it gives members less incentive to be
informed about or take an active role in the business. 249 The court
enumerated the Howey test, as described above, and then applied the
elements. 250
The parties agreed that the first two ele25 1
ments-investment of money and common enterprise-were met.
The court went on to examine the third and fourth prongs-the expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others. 2 After analyzing the Williamson v. Tucker reasoning,2 53 the court stated that to
determine whether investors had control over the profitability of the
enterprise, it must "look at both legal and practical control., 254 Here,
the LLC Articles of Organization provided that the members had legal control, but the court held that they had little, if any, ability to
exercise actual effective control over the LLCs. 5 All principal management function was turned over to the managing LLC, the members
had little or no input in the decision whether to enter construction
agreements, and because the member base was large in number and
geographically dispersed, the management power was diluted to such
an extent that the members were prevented from exercising any effective control.2 5 6 Further, the typical investor in this type of business
arrangement would lack the technical expertise necessary to actually
manage the LLCs. 257 This court adopted a previous Fifth Circuit
holding mandating that to meet the "knowledge" requirement in Williamson, the investors must have meaningful knowledge of the specific
business being operated. 8 The court pointed out that "[t]he securi248. Id.
249. Id. at 833-34 (quoting Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 378, 404 (1992)).
250. Id. at 830-31; see supra text accompanying notes 138-227.
251. Nutek, 977 P.2d at 830.
252. Id.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 229-40.
254. See Nutek, 977 P.2d at 831.
255. Id.at 831-32.
256. Id. at 831-32.
257. Id. at 832.
258. Id. The court refers to Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., in which the Fifth Circuit
court stated:
In Williamson ...our discussion made clear that the knowledge inquiry must
be tied to the nature of the underlying venture.... Williamson ...clearly
requires that the investors' knowledge and experience be evaluated with reference to the nature of the underlying venture .... [A]ny holding to the
contrary would be inconsistent with Howey itself.
Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 134 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
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ties laws are designed to protect less-than-prudent investors from giv2 59
ing their money to irresponsible or unscrupulous businessmen.
Therefore, the court held that the members did rely on the efforts of
others in order to make any profit, and that this prong of the Howey
test was met as well. 26" Because all of the Howey factors of an investment contract were met, the court held that these membership interests were securities.2 6 '
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case 262 and has yet
to rule on whether an LLC membership interest constitutes a security.
This case, though, will most likely serve as a benchmark and provide
the leading analysis for cases that require the application of the securities laws to LLCs.
IV.

TEXAS'S TREATMENT OF LLC MEMBER INTERESTS UNDER
BLUE SKY LAWS AND THE PROBLEMS ACCOMPANYING

THAT TREATMENT

The definition of a security in section 4 of the Texas Securities Act
is quite similar to the definition of a security in the federal Securities
Acts of 1933 and 1934.263 It includes
any limited partner interest in a limited partnership, share, stock,
treasury stock . . . note, bond, debenture, mortgage certificate or
other evidence of indebtedness, any form of commercial paper, certificate in or under a profit sharing ... agreement,... or any certificate or instrument representingor secured by an interest in any or all
of the capital, property, assets, profits or earnings of any company,
investment contract, or any other instrument commonly known as a
security, whether similar to those herein referred to or not.2 64
According to David Weaver, General Counsel at the Texas State Securities Board, the Board's view is that all LLC membership interests
fall within the italicized language above or under the investment contract (Howey) test.2 65 The State Securities Board's position is that
LLCs fall within the statutory definition of a "security," though this is
not expressed in any rule or regulation. 266 Investors should see the
broad language of section 4 above and see that the LLC falls within
that definition, says the Board, even though LLCs are not required to
259. Nutek, 977 P.2d at 833.
260. Id. at 834-35.
261. Id. at 835.
262. AKS Daks Communications, Inc. v. Ariz. Corps. Comm'n, 528 U.S. 932
(1999), denying cert. to Nutek, 977 P.2d 826.
263. Compare TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A) (Vernon Supp. 2002), with
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2000), and id. § 78c(a)(10).
264. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A) (emphasis added).
265. Telephone Interview with David Weaver, General Counsel, Texas State Securities Board (Sept. 25, 2001) (transcript on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review);
see also supra text accompanying notes 138-227.
266. Telephone Interview with David Weaver, supra note 265.
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issue certificates or instruments, as discussed in Part II.B.4. above.2 67
In fact, most items that look like securities are statutory securities
with the exception of annuity insurance contracts, which must be registered with the Texas Department of Insurance. 6 8 The Board has
not advocated amending the Texas Securities Act to include LLC
member interests, as many states have done, because it is nearly impossible to capture all new investment vehicles. 269 Every year, new
investment vehicles are invented, and as the Texas Legislature only
27 0
meets every two years, it is impracticable to capture them all.
Therefore, in the State Securities Board's view, LLCs must comply
with the Texas Securities Act unless the offer of member interests
meets one of the exemptions set out in section 5 or the rules in Chapter 139 of the Act. 27 '
The Act provides exemptions for a number of enumerated transactions so long as certain conditions are met.27 2 Some of those pertinent
exemptions are: judicial sales or bankruptcy proceedings,2 73 sales from
the personal inventory of a vendor whose business is not the sale of
securities so long as the sale is an isolated transaction,2 74 sales by insurance companies, 277 sales "made without any public solicitation or
advertisements" 1) by an "issuer ... so long as the total number of
security holders of the issuer thereof does not exceed thirty-five...
persons;" 2) by an employer of a security under a "thrift, savings,
stock purchase, retirement, pension, profit-sharing,... bonus, . . . incentive, or similar ... plan;" or 3) "the sale by an issuer of its securities during the ... twelve months ending with the date of the sale in
question to not more than fifteen ... persons ... provided [those]
persons purchased such securities for their own account and not for
distribution, '276 and "[t]he execution by a dealer of [a] purchase of
securities, where the initial offering of such securities has been completed and . . .the dealer [is acting] solely as an agent for the purchaser, has no . . . interest in the sale, . . . and receives no . . .
compensation from any other source than the purchaser. '277 The
Texas Securities Act defines "issuer" to "include every company or
person who proposes to issue, has issued, or shall hereafter issue any

security. "278
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5.
Id. at art. 581-5(A).
Id.at art. 581-5(C)(1).
Id. at art. 582-5(C)(2).
Id. at art. 581-5(l).
Id. at art. 581-5(P).
Id. at art. 581-4(G).
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In its 2001 Session, the Texas Legislature appears to have overruled
the State Securities Board and amended the state Blue Sky laws to
categorically exclude limited liability companies from the definition of
a security.2 7 9 The statute now reads:
An interest in a partnership or limited liability company is not a
security unless it is dealt in or traded on securities exchanges or in
securities markets, its terms expressly provide that it is a security
governed by this chapter, or it is an investment company security.
However, an interest in a partnership or limited liability
280 company is
a financial asset if it is held in a securities account.
Therefore, it appears that the Legislature has overruled Williamson
and its progeny to allow for the owners of partnerships or limited liability companies to "opt-in" to the securities laws by trading on the
securities exchanges or by expressly providing in the partnership or
operating agreement that owners' interests are securities.28 '
The problem with both approaches is that LLCs are becoming increasingly popular. In 2000 alone, 16,844 LLCs were formed in
Texas.28 2 The LLC has surpassed the characterization of being "just
another over-clever tax dodge doomed to a brief career, '28 3 and it has
emerged as a "viable, mainstream alternative to the corporation or
partnership. 28 4 Investors must not be required to read complicated
statutory language to determine whether the investment opportunity
being offered to them comes with the protection of the state securities
laws, as the Board would have them do. The Legislature's approach
fails to account for the increasingly popular nature of the LLC and
fails to protect the investing public. In addition, using the traditional
common law approach to solve the problems associated with LLCs
will not provide the most speedy and efficient solution for the investing public. A statutory solution provides more immediate protection
for potential investors and more certainty for business owners, leading
to an efficient market and a more attractive atmosphere in Texas for
foreign investors. Uncertainty and the threat of litigation only discourage business owners from attempting to reside in this jurisdiction.
V.

OTHER STATES' TREATMENT OF LLC MEMBER INTERESTS

State legislatures and state securities boards have approached the
issue of whether LLC membership interests are securities in a number
of ways.28 5 This Part will examine those approaches, will weigh their
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.103(c) (Vernon 2002).
Id.
See id. § 8.103(c) & cmt. 4; supra notes 228-39 and accompanying text.
E-mail from Tina Passell, supra note 33.
See Sargent, Securities?, supra note 99, at 1069.
Hamill, supra note 32, at 393.
Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 17, at 630-35.
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benefits and drawbacks, and will suggest the best method for Texas to
adopt.
In a majority of the states, no attempt to define the nature of the
LLC membership interests has been made.2 8 6 This leaves the issue to
be resolved through the application of the Howey test, discussed
above,2 87 in the courts and commissions.28 8 Some state securities administrators have attempted to guide the courts in their application of
the Howey test to LLCs. 289 "In New York and South Carolina, the
primary factor will be the structure of the limited liability company
[especially noting] whether the members are passive investors. '290 In
Connecticut and Tennessee, the securities boards have indicated that
with member-managed LLCs, the Williamson factors2 91 should be
used.2 92 In Michigan, the legislature indicates that "[a]n interest in a
limited liability company to which this act applies is a security to the
same extent as an interest in a corporation, partnership, or limited
partnership is a security. 2 93 The import of this language is unclear,2 94
but the implication seems to be that LLC interests will be subject to
the standard investment contract analysis, using the Howey test outlined above.2 9 ' Leaving the determination to the courts, though, provides little certainty for investors and business planners. The cost of
litigation, just to decide whether compliance with the securities laws is
necessary, is the least desirable solution. Given that the LLC is new
and burgeoning, the legislatures of the several states should make formal findings and set parameters to resolve the issue.
The approach taken by the Texas Securities Board-an informal,
unpublished opinion that LLC membership interests are securities296-is also the approach used by Louisiana and New Hampshire.29 7 These states express an opinion that "essentially all LLC
interests are securities," but this position is not formally articulated in
any regulation, interpretive release, advisory opinion, or no-action let286. See id. at 633-34. Examples of such states include Delaware, D.C., Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Mark A. Sargent, State
Treatment of LLC Interests as Securities (as of 11/18/96), 3 J. LIMITED LIABILITY Cos.

137 (1996).
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

See supra text accompanying notes 138-227.
Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 17, at 633-34.
Id. at 634.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 229-40.
Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 17, at 634.

293.

MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.

§ 450.5103 (West Supp. 2002).

294. See Mark A. Sargent, Blue Sky Law: Will Limited Liability Companies Punch
a Hole in the Blue Sky?, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 429, 437 (1994) [hereinafter Sargent, Blue
Sky].
295. See supra text accompanying notes 138-227.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 263-78.
297. Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 17, at 634 & n.356; Sargent, Blue Sky, supra
note 294, at 431 & n.11.
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ter.29 8 While this approach may allow for flexibility in dealing with

new investment schemes, it provides little certainty for business planners and investors.
Other states have amended their statutes to include LLC membership interests, without qualification, in the definition of a "security."
Ohio, for example, states that a "'[slecurity' . . . includes shares of
stock, certificates for shares of stock, membership interests in limited
liability companies . . . [and] any investment contract . . 299 The
owners of LLCs may then be exempt from registration because of the
limited number of investors, or the intrastate offering,3 0 but it would
be up to the business owners to find such an exemption and ensure
that the sales of membership interests fall within it. This approach
may provide the needed certainty desired, but in either case, categorically deciding in advance that all interests in LLCs are securities may
be over-inclusive, "despite its apparent virtue of simplicity."30 1 Small,
partnership-like LLCs with a few members who share control of the
enterprise need not deal with the formalities of the securities laws and
exemptions.30 2 In addition, because Texas allows for single member
LLCs,3 °3 it would be anomalous indeed to require such an LLC to
deal with securities regulation at all.
California has attempted to list standards for public LLCs by adopting a new definition of securities.30 4 The legislature expressed its concern with the previous status of the law: "It is a concern of the
Legislature that, while this act is designed to assist the formation and
operation of small or closely held ... business arrangements, limited
liability companies may become a format for a publicly held business
entity to transact business without adequate provision for governance
standards, including rights of securities holders. ' 30 5 The definition of
a "security" in California now includes:
any... interest in a limited liability company and any class or series
of those interests (including any fractional or other interest in that
298. Sargent, Blue Sky, supra note 294, at 431.
299. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (Anderson Supp. 2001) (emphasis added); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-2(X) (Michie Supp. 2002) (defining a security as "a note; stock; treasury stock ... [or] any interest in a limited liability
company"); VT.STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4202a(16) (Lexis through Sept. 2001) (defining a
security as "any note, stock, treasury stock ... [or] any membership interest in a
limited liability company").
300. See supra text accompanying notes 272-78 (discussing typical exemptions).
Similar exemptions exist in other states' and the federal securities laws.
301. Sargent, Blue Sky, supra note 294, at 438.
302. See Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 17, at 637-38.
303. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 4.01(A) (Vernon 1997).

304. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West Supp. 2002); Mark A. Sargent, LLCs as
Securities-CaliforniaStyle, J. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 181, 181, 183 (1995)
[hereinafter Sargent, California].
305. S.B. 469, § 95, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994), available at http://
info.sen.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/sen/sb-0451-0500/sb 469_bill 940930_Chaptered (last
visited Feb. 11, 2003) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
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interest), except a membership interest in a limited liability company in which the person claiming this exception can prove that all
of the members are actively engaged in the management of the limited liability company; provided that evidence that members vote or
have the right to vote, or the right to information concerning the
business and affairs of the limited liability company, or the right to
participate in management, shall not establish, without more, that
all members are actively engaged in the management of the limited
liability company ....
This exception seems to be a straightforward adoption by the legislature of the "Efforts of Others" element of the Howey test as the
dividing line between that which is a security and that which is not.3" 7
Significantly, the statute clearly states that all members must be actively engaged in the management of the LLC, suggesting that a single
passive investor would force the LLC to fall outside the exception.3 °8
The problem associated with California's approach is that the exception may be hard to prove until the courts have had occasion to interpret this language. For example, "contractual rights to participate in
management, to vote, or to receive information. .. 'without more"' do
not establish active involvement in management. 30 9 The question becomes how much "more" must be shown.3 10 It appears that the members would need to prove that they have materially exercised those
contractual rights or that they have a real opportunity to do so in the
future.3 11 One factor that is likely to come into play is "whether the
members have the sophistication and experience needed to exercise
those rights[, especially] if the LLC has a complicated [management]
structure or if it is engaged in [any] complex, technical, or heavilyregulated [industry]. 3 12 California has avoided the simplistic approach of adding LLC membership interests to their statutory definition of a "security" without exception, but the scheme still requires a
case-by-case determination.3 1 3 Compliance with the statutory exception will produce costs of its own in attempting to define the elements
and strictly tailoring one's business to ensure each is met.31 4
Likely the best solution adopted thus far is found in Wisconsin,3 15
where a three-tiered approach has been codified. First, Wisconsin law
states that an LLC interest is presumed to be a security if "the articles
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West Supp. 2002).
307. Sargent, California,supra note 304, at 181; see supra Part III.B.4. (discussing
the "Efforts of Others" element).
308. Sargent, California, supra note 304, at 181.
309. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (emphasis added); Sargent, California, supra note
304, at 182.
310. Sargent, California, supra note 304, at 182.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See id.
315. See Sargent, Blue Sky, supra note 294, at 440.

306.
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of organization vest management of the limited liability company in
...one or more managers who are not members, or if the aggregate
number of members of the limited liability company, after the interest
is sold, exceeds 35.3 16 Second, if the LLC vests managerial authority
in persons who are members and the number of members does not
317
exceed 35, then the LLC interest is presumed not to be a security.
Finally, if the total number of members is 15 or fewer and the right to
manage is vested in the members, then the LLC interests are not securities, and no further analysis is required.3 1 8 Professor Sargent
points out that this scheme "takes a subtle and balanced approach to
the question that avoids a simplistic either/or treatment of the member-managed/manager-managed dichotomy."31 9 Wisconsin's approach has several advantages, he says:
Most importantly, it draws a bright line establishing the clear caseinterests in an LLC with relatively few members and all members
holding management authority are not securities. It also avoids the
trap of declaring interests in all manager-managed LLC securities,
and ... creat[es] a well-balanced pair of opposing presumptions. If
an LLC is manager-managed or has a large number of members
(more than 35), a rebuttable presumption that its interests are securities will arise. If the LLC is member-managed, and has only a
middling number of members, a rebuttable
presumption that the in320
terests are not securities will apply.
This flexible approach will provide the much-needed notice and certainty for investors and business planners alike. It avoids the overinclusion of states like Texas and Ohio, while providing some structure
and avoiding the litigation trap inherent in the New York, Connecticut, and Tennessee schemes. If the LLC is small and closely-held, no
additional proof will be required in order to escape the reach of the
securities laws. This is appropriate, because in the typical LLC with
less than fifteen members, all members will be actively engaged in the
enterprise, a point recognized in the Texas exemptions from registration.3 21 On the other hand, large LLCs with numerous investors will
be presumed to constitute securities vehicles, requiring compliance
with registration and anti-fraud rules. The LLC owners can rebut this
presumption by proving to the State Securities Board that all members are truly actively engaged in managing the affairs of the enterprise. This approach protects investors and provides business owners
with the certainty and low risk of litigation they desire.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

WIs. STAT. ANN. § 551.02(13)(c) (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. § 551.02(13)(b).
Sargent, Blue Sky, supra note 294, at 437.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 276.
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In Nutek Information Systems, Inc. v. Arizona Corp. Commission,3 22 if a law similar to Wisconsin's had been in place, litigation
could have been avoided. Once the promoters solicited more than 35
investors, the membership interest sales would have been presumed to
be the sale of securities. In that case, the promoters collected more
than $10 million from 920 investors.32 3 Therefore, they would have
been required to comply with the securities laws as to registration and
disclosure, and they would have had exposure to strict liability for the
fraud alleged by the Arizona Corporation Commission.3 24
Similarly, in Vision Communications, Inc.,325 where dozens of investors (significantly over thirty-five members) were enticed to invest in a
Texas "wireless cable" LLC, the presumption would have been that
the promoters were selling securities.3 26 Unless the promoters could
convince the State Securities Board that all of the members were actively engaged in managing the enterprise, the sales would have to be
registered, and the company would have to make full and accurate
disclosure under the law. In both cases, the issue could have been
decided without the parties going to the expense and time to go to
court. More importantly, if the disclosure requirements under securities laws were met, it is far less likely that the investors would have
given their money to these unscrupulous businessmen in the first
place.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

As the number of limited liability companies organized in Texas
continues to grow at a rapid rate, the issue of whether to treat them as
securities will become increasingly important. While some will still
argue that treating any LLC member interests as securities will stymie
entrepreneurship and make the LLC form less desirable, the reality is
that many LLCs are quite large with hundreds, if not thousands, of
members who deserve the protection of the securities laws. Avoiding
problems such as those associated with the "wireless cable" schemes
and those associated with the potential of endless litigation regarding
definitional issues is important for both investor groups and business
owners. It is likely that the Texas State Securities Board is correct,
that many LLC membership interests do constitute securities, but at
the same time, many do not. The LLC is an attractive business form
for both large conglomerates and the "Mom and Pop" operation.
322. 977 P.2d 826 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied sub nom., AKS Daks Communications, Inc. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 528 U.S. 932 (1999).
323. Id. at 828.
324. See id. at 828-29; see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.02(13)(c) (West Supp. 2001).
325. Litigation Release No. 14,026, 56 SEC Docket (CCH) 880 (D.D.C. Mar. 24,
1994).
326. Compare Alleged Boiler Room Sales of Interests in Cable Venture Subject of
SEC Suit, 26 SEc. REG. & L. REPORT 662 (1994), with Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 551.02(13)(c).
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Characterizing all of these as securities will only detract from those
features of the LLC that have made it so attractive-the ease of creating it, the relative informality, and the limited liability. However,
those same attractions have led the unsophisticated and unwary investor to become involved with failing or fraudulent LLC schemes with
hundreds of members and no one to hold liable for their lost money.
Therefore, a rebuttable presumption approach, such as that adopted
by the legislature in Wisconsin, is the best created thus far to accommodate all of these competing concerns. A concrete, three-tiered approach takes into account the varying nature of LLCs and provides
the structure that is necessary to a certain business plan. The Domino's Pizzas and Vision Communications of the world will be treated
as securities, requiring compliance with securities laws, but the corner
grocery store or neighborhood plumber will not have to deal with the
issue at all. The Texas Legislature should follow Wisconsin's lead and
amend the Texas statutes to deal with this issue sooner, rather than
later, to avoid any more investor loss and unnecessary litigation, and
to protect the integrity of the market as a whole.
Kimberley C. Latham
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